Introduction
Is competition good for innovation? There is a large literature comparing monopoly and competition, going back to [Schumpeter 1912 ] [Arrow 1962 ]. This paper adds the comparison between collusion and competition. It introduces a two-period model. Two suppliers of a homogenous good know that, in the second period, they will be able to collude in the product market. However, in the …rst period, either of them is able to invest into process innovation. Collusion in the …rst period is excluded.
The paper shows that collusion does leave room for innovation. Yet in the collusive case innovation incentives are weaker than in the competitive case. In the competitive case, the innovator undercuts the previous competitive price. It sells the previous competitive quantity +", but produces at the lower cost. This gives the innovator a positive pro…t. It is the quantity sold, times the cost reduction ". This gain must outweigh the innovation cost. With collusion, the innovation incentive is due to the fact that the distribution of gains from collusion is at stake. The paper assumes that cartel pro…ts are shared in accordance with the Nash bargaining solution, with status quo payo¤s given by the players payo¤s in the noncooperative version of the price setting game. If only one …rm innovates, this changes the status quo payo¤ to the advantage of the innovator and to the disadvantage of the competitor. If only one …rm innovates, the competitor loses part of the gains from collusion. Innovation is no longer driven by greed only. The complementary motive of fear comes into play.
Moreover, without collusion, in equilibrium only one …rm innovates, provided the cost of innovation is smaller than the pro…t of the innovator. If both innovate, both make zero pro…t, and have to bear the cost of innovation. If the other …rm innovates, it is the best response not to engage in innovation. This result also holds with collusion if innovation is so costly that it is only pro…table for a single innovator. However, if innovation is less costly, in equilibrium both …rms innovate. This even holds if, as a result, both of them are worse o¤ than before innovation. This is an equilibrium as long as not being the innovator reduces the pro…t even more.
It seems that the question has not been investigated thus far. Closest is [Arrow 1962 ]. But in his paper, competition is compared to monopoly, not to collusion. Moreover there is intellectual property, which is assumed away here. Most of the large literature on innovation has assumed competition in the product markets [Freeman 1960, for an overview] . This is di¤erent for the literature on R&D joint ventures [d 'Aspremont 1988] [Cellini 2002 ] [Suetens 2005 ]. However, these authors are interested in cooperative or collusive invention, not in collusion in the product markets. There is an extensive literature on differentiated oligopoly [Cellini 2003, for an overview] . Most of this literature is interested in the e¤ects of innovation on the stability of explicit or implicit cartels [Deneckere 1983 [Rothschild 1997 ] [Albaek 1998 ] [Lambertini 1999 ] [Posada 2000 ] [Symeonidis 2002] . Others wanted to know how …rms self-select to di¤erent points of the quality spectrum [Dutta 1990 ] [Lambertini 1996] , and what the prospect of future competition means for innovation investment ]. Yet others have investigated under which conditions collusion in sequential innovation might be socially bene…cial [Denicolò 2002 ].
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 compares the incentives for process innovation in the competitive and in the collusive case. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the results. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Two risk-neutral …rms play a game of two periods. In the …rst period, they have an opportunity to do research and development regarding the technology to produce a homogenous good. In the second period, they compete in price. In the product market, they interact simultaneously. There is no market entry. For the demand, switching from one supplier to another is free of charge. Production is to demand. Demand is normal and anonymous. It is given by p = Q, where p is price, Q is quantity, is the intercept, and is the slope. Demand has no countervailing power. Demand thus takes the prices posted by the suppliers.
The …rms are able to collude in the product market. They split gains from collusion according to the Nash bargaining scheme [Nash 1950 ]. Each …rm is able to enforce the collusion agreement against the other. Side payments are possible and enforceable.
Initially both suppliers have identical constant marginal production cost < . There is no …xed cost. In the …rst period, they have the costly opportunity to invest in process innovation. It reduces production cost to < . Innovation cost I is common knowledge. If innovation has been successful, each supplier may credibly inform its competitor about the resulting reduction in production cost.
The resulting two period game is solved by backwards induction. The …rms anticipate their payo¤s in four situations: neither of them invests 00 , the other invests 01 , both invest 11 , the …rm is the only to invest 10 . Based on these results, and on I, they decide whether to invest.
Innovation Incentives
Innovation incentives in the noncooperative case provide the benchmark. They result from comparing payo¤s pre and post innovation. In the collusive case, the payo¤ pre innovation is half the gains from collusion. Innovation increases the gains from collusion, and it gives the innovator a higher status quo payo¤. These e¤ects translate into a higher payo¤ for the innovator, and a lower payo¤ for the competitor, compared to the gains from collusion pre innovation. If both innovate, they split the increased gains from collusion evenly. Consequently, a …rm is best o¤ if it is the only to innovate, over being one of two innovators, over both not innovating, over being the one that has not innovated, if the other has innovated. Given this ranking of payo¤s, innovation incentives are driven by innovation cost. It turns out that innovation incentives are always stronger in the competitive case, and that collusion is never e¢ cient.
The Competitive Benchmark
If there is no collusion in the second period, the …rms play the standard Bertrand game [Bertrand 1883] , with price p = , and industry quantity Q = This gives each of them 00 = 0. If both innovate, they still expect 11 = 0. If only one of them innovates, it has 10 = The incumbent has 01 = 0. Payo¤s are thus ranked 10 > 11 = 00 = 01 . It is straightforward to see that this results in a battle of the sexes. In pure strategies, one and only one …rm invests if 10 I > 0. Consequently, for innovation to occur, the innovation cost may at most be I max < Otherwise, there is no investment. Consumer rent is given by
Provided there is investment, welfare is
Collusion Without Innovation
If they collude, the two …rms set cartel price
Industry pro…t is
The Nash bargaining scheme asks them to split this evenly, so that each of them has
Innovation
If only one …rm innovates, its status quo payo¤ goes up to 10 = while the status quo payo¤ of the incumbent remains 01 = 0. The new pro…t maximising price and quantity arê
If the innovation is radical, i.e. if
there is no longer room for collusion. However, if
, i.e. if the innovation is non-radical, the competitor is still able to undercut the pro…t maximising price. In a cartel, the competitor agrees not to supply the product, against a side payment. Industry pro…t then iŝ
The Nash bargaining scheme requires
and gives the innovator 
Ranking of Payo¤s
Under the assumption from the baseline model that > 0, and under the further assumption from (1) that the innovation is non-radical, these payo¤s are ordered 10 > 11 > 00 > 01 To see this, compare If the innovation is non-radical, 2 2 > 0. Hence the inequality holds. This is not surprising. At the borderline, i.e. with = , the innovator is indi¤erent between collusion and going it alone, since the Nash bargaining scheme gives the competitor a payo¤ of 0.
Were they still to calculate the same way, with = + ", the Nash result for the competitor would grow to "
However this is meaningless since applying the Nash bargaining scheme only makes sense if there are gains from trade.
Innovation Decisions
Both …rms innovate if 10 I > 11 I > 00 > 01 , and if 10 I > 00 > 11 I > 01 . The latter case is possible only because, ignoring investment cost, 00 > 01 . Note that in this case both …rms lose money, compared to the situation without innovation. In this case, the Bertrand dilemma extends to the two period game with innovation. Finally, double investment is a possibility if 00 > 10 I > 11 I > 01 . This game is a stag hunt. In the one equilibrium in pure strategies, both …rms invest. In the other both do not invest. In the latter, their payo¤s are higher. One …rm innovates if 10 I > 00 > 01 > 11 I. No …rm innovates if 00 > 01 > 10 I > 11 I and if 00 > 10 I > 01 > 11 I.
The maximum investment cost I depends on the equilibrium. If in equilibrium only one …rm innovates, To see how the respective maximum investments are ranked, check
This is positive since, from the assumptions, > . 
E¢ ciency
Without innovation, but with collusion, consumer rent is
Welfare is given by
If either or both …rms innovate, consumer rent goes up to
If only one …rm innovates, welfare is
If both …rms innovate, welfare is reduced to
Hence it is never e¢ cient that both …rms innovate.
Comparison to the Competitive Case
In the competitive case, never both …rms innovate. One …rm innovates if
In the collusive case, one …rm innovates if
Comparing one has
Using (1), with the largest possible , this becomes
, which is positive. The maximum investment is larger in the competitive than in the collusive case.
Why is that? Collusion brings the innovator under the spell of its competitor. As long as the innovation is not radical, the innovator must give the competitor something in recompense for not using its power to undercut the new monopoly price. Of course, post innovation, Nash bargaining gives the innovator half of the status quo payo¤ plus half of the gains from collusion. With collusion, the innovator thus has a higher payo¤ than with competition. However, this is not how the innovator calculates. It compares innovating with not innovating, but colluding. In the latter case, its payo¤ would have been half of the gains from collusion without innovation. As long as the innovation is not radical, the innovator is unable to fully appropriate this. Graphically, the situation looks as in Figure 1 .
In the competitive case, the innovator has A + B + C. With collusion, but without innovation, both …rms have D. Post innovation, the innovator has
Innovation never lowers the cartel price as much as the innovation. Hence I max I C max > B . Another way of making the point is this: The innovation incentive with competition enters Nash bargaining as the status quo payo¤ of the innovator. The Nash scheme gives the innovator half of this, plus half of the gains from collusion. From the latter, the innovator subtracts half of the gains from collusion pre innovation. Hence for innovation incentives to be stronger with collusion,
would have to hold. However, the cartel setsp C such thatp
C > p , the cartel only sellsQ C < Q . Consequently in both the price and the quantity dimensions Using (1), and evaluating at the borderline, this becomes 3 ( ) 2 ; which is positive. Consequently, even if only one …rm innovates, collusion is ine¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency grows if, in equilibrium, both …rms innovate.
Discussion
Does the model resemble a situation that occurs in reality? With process innovation, this is not implausible. In the product market, duopolists play a repeated game with many rounds and uncertain end. In many markets, observing the market behaviour of competitors is not di¢ cult. This makes it possible to exploit strategies like tit-for-tat to sustain collusion; of course, the folk theorem holds [Aumann 1994 ]. In most markets, innovation is a much less frequent event. Therefore, discount factors are more critical, and may well make it impossible to collude not to innovate, or to coordinate innovation activities. Moreover, process innovation is relatively easy to hide while it happens. In many markets, the innovator therefore stands a realistic chance to surprise its competitor.
How robust is the …nding that innovation incentives are stronger with competition? Does the result only hold since marginal cost has been assumed to be constant? With decreasing marginal cost, the situation is pretty much the same. If they compete in the product market, and without innovation, both …rms make zero pro…t. The same holds if both innovate. Hence in the competitive case, payo¤s are ranked as with constant marginal cost. In equilibrium, only one …rm innovates. With increasing marginal cost, there is a positive producer rent even without innovation or collusion. Innovation is no longer the only way to make a pro…t. This reduces innovation incentives if one compares constant and increasing marginal cost. However in the comparison between competition and collusion, given marginal cost increases, the opportunity cost resulting from the positive producer rent cancels out. For now both …rms have a positive status quo payo¤. The Nash scheme gives the innovator half of the gains from collusion post innovation + half of its own status quo payo¤ -half of the status quo payo¤ of its competitor. Hence, the Nash result for the innovator is half of the increase in gains from collusion + half of the innovation incentive in the competitive case. For the same reason as with constant marginal cost, the increase in gains from collusion is strictly smaller than the innovation incentive in the competitive case.
Conclusion
The paper has two tentative messages, one to the intellectual property community, and another to the antitrust community. If …rms compete in price, i.e. if capacity limits do not matter, intellectual property is not the only way how to incentivize innovation. A complementary incentive results from the desire to free oneself from control by the competitor. The e¤ect remains strong if …rms are able to collude in the product market, but it is strictly smaller than in the competitive case. This …nding is particularly relevant in industries where the cost of inventing around is small, despite the existence of intellectual property rights [Levin 1987, 809, for empirical evidence] .
The antitrust message is clear within the framework of the model presented in the paper. While collusion does only mildly a¤ect innovation incentives, it is not e¢ cient. A particularly harmful e¤ect of collusion is that it induces double innovation whenever the innovation cost is su¢ ciently small.The antitrust message becomes more ambigous if one assumes a less certain world; innovation is about navigating uncharted territory, after all. Innovators hardly ever know exactly how likely they are to succeed [Knight 1921 ]. Normally, they do not even know ex ante what exactly success means. In innovative activities, the problem space is usually not well de…ned [Kirzner 1994 ]. In either case, double investment reduces the risk that there is no innovation at all, since coordination on the equilibrium fails. It doubles the chances that a fundamental, rather than only a marginal innovation takes place. The fact that double investment does not yield zero pro…ts works like an insurance. Even if the competitor also succeeds, innovation investments are not futile. Of course, the Harberger ine¢ ciency persists [Harberger 1964] , as do the X-ine¢ ciencies that usually go along with cartels [Leibenstein 1966] . But knowing about the positive e¤ect on innovation incentives, antitrust policy faces a harder choice than is traditionally maintained.
